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A Reflection on Epstein and His Critics
ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL*
Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain is a powerful and challenging book. So challenging,
that apparently some of its critics would much prefer that the book
had never been written and, one suspects, that such thoughts had
never been conceived. But more of that in a moment.
My initial afterthought on the Conference proceedings-for our
assignment from this Review's editors is to reflect on those happenings
rather than to reprise our own quibbles with Richard-is directed at a
seeming retraction that Richard embraced in the heat of battle, but
should on reflection regret. When pressed by several of the partici-
pants, myself included, on the theoretical incompatibility of his natu-
ral rights underpinning with utilitarianism, Richard offered this
rejoinder, one that troubles me greatly and perplexes other of his
would-be sympathizers:
So Ellen, I never would invoke natural rights in my own theory of
the Constitution, but when its gets to the political dimension, I
want allegiance. Natural rights is the language that people under-
stand and relate to; that's the language I think that one has to use
to some degree. It is not a case of fraud. It is an effort to show
people the congruence between their own beliefs and the system of
underlying utilitarian structures.'
And, again, much later in the discussion, Richard returned to this
point:
Do I believe in natural rights? Again, my sense is that if you're
doing constitutional interpretation, then natural rights theory sim-
ply means that the meaning of key terms found in the Constitution
cannot be defined by the legislatures that are bound by them. I
continue to remain a natural rights philosopher in that particular
sense. And I continue to remain a natural rights philosopher in the
sense that I stated in the first chapter; the definition of what counts
as property, like the definition of what counts as murder, like the
definition of what counts as freedom, is something which has to be
settled prior to, and independent of, the state.2
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The first statement is disconcerting because it seems so remarka-
bly out of spirits with the book and, dare I say it, even slightly disin-
genuous. What I found refreshing about the book was precisely its
repeated reliance on natural rights as providing both the starting
point of political discourse and the first principle, i.e., that the state
cannot do what individuals could not do prior to the formation of the
state. I took this approach-naively as it turned out-to be a modifi-
cation of Richard's earlier writings, which also embraced natural
rights and utilitarianism as a coherent moral position, but with a
decided tilt toward the latter. Despite the grand edifice of Takings,
which is built upon natural rights foundations (although not consist-
ently, as I and others pointed out), nothing has really changed-Rich-
ard is still trying to mix oil and water-or has it?
So where does Richard really stand? Is he the neo-Lockean of
Takings; the Platonic guardian telling necessary lies to deceive the
masses into accepting his system (as in the first quote above); or is he
a kind of formalistic, definitional rights theorist (as the second state-
ment above indicates)? Let me enter a plea for clarification, Richard.
To turn, now, to Richard's critics, I detected a clear desire on the
part of Joseph Sax, Mark Kelman, and Tom Grey to excise com-
pletely views such as Richard expressed in Takings from academic,
and indeed, polite discourse. (The ensuing remarks are in no sense
directed at Cass Sunstein, who tried to beat a theory with a theory,
and as always was the consummate gentleman, open to disparate
ideas and ready to dispute them in an open-minded manner.) A few
brief quotations will evince the spirit of their comments.
From Joseph Sax (who later modified this introduction to his
paper without, however, laundering the rest of the piece): "Like a
scruffy dog, this is a book that will tempt every passerby to give it a
kick. Its philosophy is little more than assertion, its approach to con-
stitutional analysis is unrecognizable and its conclusions are
stupefying."3
Tom Grey was much perturbed about Richard's moral sensibili-
ties as manifested in his desire to roll back the welfare state. Grey
found Richard indifferent to "starving children or freezing derelicts":
What to make of this kind of stuff? In one sense, Takings
belongs with the output of the constitutional lunatic fringe, the
effusions of gold bugs, tax protestors, and gun-toting survivalists.
It is a sign of the times that the book is published not under
some vanity or right-wing specialty imprint, but by the Harvard
University Press. Richard Epstein himself is no semi-literate
3. Sax, Book Review I (unpublished manuscript).
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pamphleteer, but the James Parker Hall Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago. A scholar who earned a considerable repu-
tation as a prolific and interestingly eccentric commentator on pri-
vate law subjects, Epstein has become a national figure since he
began turning his attention to constitutional law in a serious way
around the time of the first Reagan election. In 1984, the Heritage
Foundation promoted him as a candidate for the Supreme Court.
Today he is "the most requested speaker" at the meetings of the
Federalist Society, the leading organization of right-wing law
students.
What he has to say in Takings is likely to find a wide and
receptive audience in today's political climate. Many of those who
object to paying taxes to support the poor are eager to hear that
their sentiments rest not on prejudice or selfishness but on high
principle.4
Not to be outdone, Mark Kelman offered up this concluding remark,
having already condemned the book as embracing a "morally abomi-
nable libertarian position":
That we've all gathered here to discuss Takings is compelling evi-
dence of the perverting effects of money [the foundation that
organized the conference awarded the participants a generous hon-
orarium]; it should serve as a reminder of the perils of allocation
through markets. The book's only useful contribution may be to
expose more fully the moral venality and intellectual vacuity of
formal, legalized libertarianism.5
When chided by Epstein on the incivility of his written comments,6
Kelman replied in a tone of wounded innocence: It was not his paper
that was "snide," as Richard charged, but rather the book itself mani-
fested a "smug and insulting" tone. What was going on here, I won-
dered? Surely Richard's book exemplified the finest of scholarly
traditions; no tone problems there, I thought (and being an editor of a
journal, I should know). So what's going on? It seems that Epstein's
three critics would prefer that such ideas-the rollback of the welfare
state, the asserted unconstitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act,7 and the constitutional enshrinement of free-market principles,
particularly of property-be considered anathema. They would like
to banish such ideas from the realm of scholarly discourse. For many
decades, liberals just did not have to confront many free-market advo-
cates during their normal, scholarly routines. They could go about
4. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 23-24 (1986).
5. Kelman, Searching for the Libertarian Core of Legalism: Comments on Richard
Epstein's Takings 34 (unpublished manuscript).
6. Proceedings, supra p. 171.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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unperturbed, all nodding in acquiescence to the same set of canards
inherited from the New Deal. Undoubtedly, many preferred it that
way, and they now wish that the ever increasing phalanx of conserva-
tive intellectuals would simply disappear-would that they could
only wish them away with a sneer.
Undoubtedly, as Grey bemoaned, Richard cannot be dismissed
so peremptorily. Richard's critics would like him back in the closet.
What has gotten them so agitated? Richard's ideas harken back to
the Founding Fathers, who, like Richard, understood that personal
liberty and liberty of property must go hand-in-hand or the former
will evaporate as government encroaches ever more swiftly on the
individual's freedom to choose. Why are these ideas so repulsive that
they ought not be mentioned in polite society, let alone in a book from
Harvard University Press? These gentlemen were hardly asked to a
conference to discuss the political philosophy of Goebbels or Pol Pot,
were they?
If liberalism, either in its classical or much transmuted modern
form, stands for anything, it stands for pluralism. Was it not John
Stuart Mill who argued that the best ideas will win out in the end as
long as everyone is allowed to say his piece? Do certain liberals no
longer believe in pluralism, in the free exchange of ideas?
Epstein's political philosophy emanates from the tradition of our
Founders; thus, it should be incumbent upon his critics to demon-
strate why that tradition is so abhorrent that individuals of advanced
training and sensibilities should shun it. It is curious, indeed, that
many denizens of our leading law schools have in recent years become
devotees of a continental tradition that shares nothing in common
with the ideology of our Founders. I refer, of course, to the Critical
Legal Theorists (the "Crits" as they like to call themselves) with
whom Mark Kelman strongly identifies. This alien growth is Marxist
in inspiration, thus totally at odds with the Lockean, property rights
system that our Founders instituted. But being a devout liberal
(whether in the old or new sense is immaterial), I find nothing intrin-
sically abhorrent about discussing Kelman's thoughts. That he, along
with Epstein's two other hostile critics, finds it difficult to reciprocate
seems to indicate a failure of nerve on their part. Or was Mill wrong,
and Richard's "bad" ideas will somehow drive out the good ones?
I would like to see civility return to academic discourse, meaning
that ideas such as Richard's and Robert Nozick's can be freely dis-
cussed and taught alongside those of Marx, Marcuse, and
Horkheimer. In a democratic, pluralistic, and liberal society we
should expect no less.
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